Real Philosophy, Good Teaching, and Academic Freedom by Matz, Lou
University of the Pacific
Scholarly Commons
College of the Pacific Faculty Articles All Faculty Scholarship
Spring 1-1-2008
Real Philosophy, Good Teaching, and Academic
Freedom
Lou Matz
University of the Pacific, lmatz@pacific.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/cop-facarticles
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the All Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
College of the Pacific Faculty Articles by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matz, L. (2008). Real Philosophy, Good Teaching, and Academic Freedom. American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Teaching
Philosophy, 7(2),
https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/cop-facarticles/559
 Volume 07, Number 2             Spring 2008
APA  Newsletters
NEWSLETTER ON TEACHING PHILOSOPHY
© 2008 by The American Philosophical Association
LETTER FROM THE EDITORS, TZIPORAH KASACHKOFF & EUGENE KELLY
ARTICLES
MARK NOWACKI AND WILFRIED VER EECKE
“Using the Economic Concept of a ‘Merit Good’ to Justify the
Teaching of Ethics Across the University Curriculum”
LOU MATZ
“Real Philosophy, Good Teaching and Academic Freedom”
Teaching Philosophy Abroad
TZIPORAH KASACHKOFF
“Comments on the Differences and Similarities in Teaching 
Philosophy in Israel and in the United States”
EUGENE KELLY
“On Teaching Abroad: The Middle East and China”
DAVID B. MARTENS
“Sketches from a Lecturer’s Notebook, Johannesburg”
BOOK REVIEWS
Yuval Lurie: Tracking the Meaning of Life: A Philosophical Journey
REVIEWED BY EUGENE KELLY
— Teaching Philosophy —
— 9 —
J. Philip Wogaman, 1986, Economics and Ethics: A 
Christian Inquiry (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 
Ch. 1. 
e. Justice in other religions.  
Seymour Siegel. “A Jewish View of Economic Justice,” 
in Contemporary Jewish Ethics and Morality, E.N. Dorff 
& L.E. Newman, eds. (Oxford University Press, 1995) 
pp. 336-43. 
Schedule
Sept 2: Introduction and overview.
Sept 7: W. Ver Eecke,  “Authority in economics”
Sept 9: Economic Justice for All.
Sept 14: W. Ver Eecke, “The Economic Order: A Human, Not a 
Natural Institution”
Sept 16: Bator, Francis M., “The Simple Analytics of Welfare 
Maximization”
Sept 21: Wildavsky, Aaron, “Why the Traditional Distinction 
between Public and Private Goods Should Be 
Abandoned”
Sept 23: W. Ver Eecke, “Objecting to a Libertarian Attack”
Sept 28: Musgrave’s introduction of the concept merit good
Sept 30: Musgrave’s many definitions and justifications
Oct 5: Musgrave’s many definitions and justifications
Oct 7: McLure, “Merit Wants: A Normatively Empty Box” 
Mackscheidt, Klaus. “Meritorische Güter: Musgraves Idee 
und Deren Konsequenzen.” (Translated)
Oct 12: Folkers, Cay, “Meritorische Güter Als Problem der  
Normativen Theorie Öffentliche Ausgaben.” (Translated)
Oct 14: Brennan, Geoffrey, and Loren Lomasky, “Institutional 
Aspects of ‘Merit Goods’ Analysis”
Oct 19: Burrows, “Efficient Pricing and Government 
Interference”
Oct 21: Ver Eecke,  “Concept of Merit Good”
Oct 26: Rawls, John, “Justice as Fairness”
Oct 28: Baier., A.,  “The Need for more than Justice”
Nov 2: Sen, A.K., “More Than 100 Million Women are Missing”
Nov 4: Sen, A.K., “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral 
Foundations of Economic Theory”
Nov 9: Ver Eecke, W., “Ethical Function of the Economy” (on 
Hegel)
Nov 11: Buchanan, James, “Fairness, Hope and Justice”
Nov 16: Stiglitz, “Whither Reform?”
Nov 18: Briefs, “The Ethos Problem in the Present Pluralistic 
Society”
Nov 23: Summary of: Olson, M., “The Political Economy of 
Comparative Growth”
 Glendon, M.A., “Rights in the Twentieth-Centur y 
Constitutions.”
 Discussion of: Ver Eecke. “Unjust redistribution in the 
American system” 
Nov 30: John Paul II, Centesimus Annus
Dec 2: W. Ver Eecke, “Structural Deficiencies in the American 
System”
Dec 7: Wogaman, Economics and Ethics: A Christian Inquiry 
Siegel, Seymour, “A Jewish View of Economic Justice”
Mechanics of the course:
1. The course will be conducted as a seminar. Sometimes 
I will summarize the content of the readings. Sometimes 
questions will be distributed to be discussed in groups and to 
be reported back to the class. Most of the time, a student will be 
assigned to present the reading material. At all times the whole 
class is expected to be prepared for discussing the material, 
unless an explicit exception is made. Questions dealing with 
problems of understanding the material will be dealt with first. 
Afterwards questions about the validity of the arguments will 
be addressed.
2. After each section, all students are expected to show their 
understanding of the material by writing a 4 page (double 
spaced) paper answering one or more questions about that 
section. The paper is to be handed in one week after the end 
of the section. A rewrite is possible for the first paper. For all 
students, one paper may be replaced by a summary of a topic 
related to the chapter but not covered in class, e.g., ideas 
from the recommended reading. Such an option needs to be 
approved by the teacher.
Graduate or professional students need to present at the 
end of the course a final paper of 10-15 pages. You may relate 
some topics covered in the course to your own research area or 
you may summarize ideas of important authors and relate them 
to topics treated in the course (Brennan, Rawls, Buchanan, 
Sen, de Soto, Krugman, Stiglitz) or you may address important 
issues such as globalization, poverty, the role of international 
institutions, wealth distribution making use of the ideas 
discussed in the class. You need to have approval for the topic 
of your research paper. 
For graduate and professional students, the research paper 
counts for half of the points determining the grade.
3.  Class participation and class presentation may count 
towards the grade. Class absence for a valid reason needs to 
be explained to the professor.
4. No final exam.
Real Philosophy, Good Teaching and Academic 
Freedom 
Lou Matz
University of the Pacific
In its “Statements on the Profession: The Teaching of 
Philosophy,” the APA exhorts philosophers, philosophy 
departments, and their institutions to be committed to providing 
“educational experiences of high quality.”1 To this end, the 
APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy shares pedagogical 
best practices, giving faculty and departments new ideas and 
approaches to teaching philosophy more effectively and to 
improving philosophy curricula. In certain circumstances, it is 
not enough, however, to use effective teaching methods; one 
must persuade one’s colleagues and institution that one is, in 
fact, delivering a quality educational experience. Since teaching 
skill is determined by others—especially by one’s colleagues 
who are typically the final authorities—how well one teaches is 
ultimately dependent on the fairness and competence of one’s 
departmental colleagues. If one’s colleagues apply unfair or 
illegitimate standards to judge the quality of instruction, one’s 
teaching skill might not only be misrepresented but one’s 
academic freedom might also be violated. I contend that this 
is what happened to me when I applied for tenure at Xavier 
University, and I recommend that the APA add a section on 
academic freedom to its “Statements on the Profession: The 
Teaching of Philosophy” to guide departments more clearly and 
to support those faculty whose pedagogical views might be at 
odds with those of their department.
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In 1992, I began a tenure-track position at Xavier University, 
a Jesuit-Catholic institution in Cincinnati, Ohio. I appeared 
to be a good fit for the department since its orientation was 
primarily historical. My graduate training at the University of 
California–San Diego was steeped in the history of philosophy 
and focused primarily on Hegel, Kant, and Plato. I wrote a 
dissertation on the relationship between freedom and character 
in Plato’s Republic and Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. For five years 
of my graduate study, I was a teaching assistant in a five-quarter 
“Great Books” writing program.
     Xavier’s department of philosophy is an undergraduate 
program whose primary function is to serve general education 
since all students must take three philosophy courses in this 
order: Ethics as Introduction to Philosophy (PHIL 100), Theory 
of Knowledge, and an upper-level elective of the student’s 
choice. My teaching load was three courses per semester, and 
in each semester for seven years, I taught two sections of PHIL 
100, which is the first philosophy course that students take and 
which is taken during their first-year, usually in the first semester. 
In the university catalogs from 1992-1996, the description of 
PHIL 100 was the following:
“The goals of human life; the first principle of morality; 
virtue, duty, law, responsibility. Special emphasis on 
justice.”
In its 1994 program review, the department summarized its 
description of PHIL 100 as follows:
“In order to insure a common philosophical culture 
for advanced study at the elective level, each section 
of the Ethics as Introduction to Philosophy course 
requires the student to read the Republic of Plato and 
to engage the question of justice.”
Finally, there was an addition to the course description in the 
1996 university catalog, a year before I applied for tenure.
“The goals of human life; the first principle of morality; 
virtue, duty, law, responsibility. Special emphasis 
on justice, along with a treatment of Deontological, 
Utilitarian and Natural Law/Right theories that are 
central to contemporary treatments of practical and 
professional ethics.”
PHIL 100 was also part of a sub-core curriculum—titled 
the “Ethics, Religion, and Society” program (E/RS)—whose 
purpose was to devote “special attention to ethical issues of 
social significance” (1996-98 Catalog). The premise of the 
E/RS program is to teach students how different disciplines—
philosophy, theology, and literature—examine ethical issues 
that are relevant today.
Within the framework of the course description for PHIL 
100, faculty were required only to teach Plato’s Republic; 
otherwise, it was their discretion to teach whatever primary 
source material that engaged the subject matter of the course. 
There was neither a requirement—stated or unstated—to 
teach any text other than the Republic nor a ranking of what 
course themes were the most important to teach, and faculty 
approached the course in a wide variety of ways.
In my fourteen semesters of teaching PHIL 100, I regularly 
varied the readings and issues in the course. Table 1 states 
by semester the works and the order in which I taught them. 
In my first semester of teaching PHIL 100, I approached 
the course in a traditional way by teaching standard ethical 
works chronologically: Plato’s Republic, Hume’s An Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals, Kant’s Groundwork of 
the Metaphysic of Morals, and Mill’s Utilitarianism and On 
Liberty. I assumed that students would have to struggle with 
the readings, and I also worried that they might have difficulty 
appreciating the importance and contemporary relevance of 
these ethical works. To make the material of the course more 
accessible and engaging for first-year students—virtually all of 
whom would not major in philosophy and who would likely not 
take any other ethics courses in philosophy—I decided to take 
a different approach. I began the next semester’s course with 
Camus’ The Plague, a novel that depicts through its characters 
different philosophical and ethical responses to human 
suffering. I then followed The Plague with Mill’s On Liberty 
and Subjection of Women. I dropped Utilitarianism altogether 
(though I reinserted it into my course a few years later) and I 
made On Liberty (along with the Republic) a permanent feature 
of my course for the following reasons: In On Liberty Mill states 
his utilitarian standard and applies it to a variety of significant 
issues of justice; On Liberty is a more complete statement of 
Mill’s ethical thought since it includes the harm principle, which 
complicates his version of utilitarianism; On Liberty includes 
Mill’s most sustained discussion of the virtues; and Mill’s defense 
of liberalism in On Liberty makes for a philosophically richer 
comparison to Plato’s Republic than Utilitarianism, especially 
given Plato’s famous critique of liberty and equality in Book 
VIII. The Subjection of Women further illustrated the application 
of Mill’s utilitarian principles to issues of sexual equality and 
provided an opportunity to discuss the appeal to “nature” or 
“natural” as a standard of morality, which Mill addresses and 
rejects in the work. During this phase of my teaching of the 
course (spring 1993 to spring 1995), I included Dostoyevsky’s 
“The Grand Inquisitor” as a challenge to Mill’s assumptions 
about the value of individual liberty.
In the next phase of my teaching of the course (fall 1995 to 
fall 1996), I dropped The Plague and The Subjection of Women 
and began the course with Plato’s Apology and Crito and then 
had students read Locke’s Second Treatise and Thoreau’s “Civil 
Disobedience” in order to offer students a later version of the 
treatment of some issues covered in the Crito. For example, I 
wanted students to see how the arguments presented by the 
Athenian Laws in the Crito reappear in Locke yet are developed 
further; how Locke’s notion of a natural moral law, though absent 
in the Crito, has its roots in Plato’s ergon argument in Book I of 
the Republic; and how morality is related to politics and law since 
in civil societies legal and political authorities are necessary to 
interpret and resolve disputes about moral issues that arise in 
many social contexts. The fourth phase of my teaching of this 
course (fall 1996-spring 1998) was similar to the third one except 
that I followed Mill’s On Liberty with chapters from Singer’s 
Practical Ethics on equality for animals, abortion, and euthanasia 
to extend our examination of issues of justice.
One of my regular pedagogical strategies in PHIL 100 
during all of these phases was occasionally to connect the ideas 
and issues in the readings to contemporary events through 
newspaper articles in order to show the relevance of philosophy 
today and to illustrate the abstract principles of the readings 
with contemporary examples. For the students, the articles 
were useful supplements to the philosophical readings, and 
for me the search for articles led me to rethink the ideas in the 
readings in new ways.
My assignments in PHIL 100 varied but usually consisted 
of two papers and two exams; or two papers, an examination, 
and regular quizzes. The papers were always thesis-based and 
required demonstration of an understanding of the relevant 
ideas in the primary source readings and a critical assessment of 
these ideas to demonstrate a capacity for independent analysis. 
The exams consisted of short-answer essay questions, often 
comparative. Whenever I used quizzes, they constituted no 
more than 25 percent of the course grade and were primarily 
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used to motivate students to read carefully in order to improve 
the quality of class discussion and to hold them accountable 
for the readings. In honors sections or in special first-year 
seminar sections of the course, I also assigned the students class 
presentations and would meet with each student out of class 
in preparation for them since the material was often difficult 
for students on their own.
My colleagues in the department had various other 
approaches to PHIL 100. For many years, the most senior 
member of the department taught only Plato’s The Trial and 
Death of Socrates, the Republic, and Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics; later, he added Aquinas and Hobbes. Another colleague 
regularly taught the Republic, Hobbes’ Leviathan, the 
Declaration of Independence, and selections from Madison in 
The Federalist Papers. Another colleague—my first department 
chair for three years—often taught only the Republic and a few 
works by Freud. Another member of the department, whom was 
hired the same year as I, often taught only Plato and Aristotle. 
Finally, there was a colleague who taught Plato, Aristotle, Hume, 
Kant, Gilligan, and Dewey.
In 1994, the department chair conducted my mid-tenure 
review. His report was based on student course evaluations and 
one class visit by a senior faculty member. The report stated 
that I proved “to be an excellent classroom teacher” and that 
students were “virtually universal in their high praise.” The 
report emphasized my effectiveness with first-year students, 
i.e., with students in my PHIL 100 course. It also stated that 
there was “some concern over matters of pedagogy,” but it 
did not give any specifics, and there was never any follow up. 
In the summary section of my review, the only area that the 
chair mentioned as an area of development was to devote less 
time to committee work and more focus on scholarship. Three 
years later, in its 1997 tenure evaluation, the department found 
“serious” problems with the quality of my PHIL 100 course. It 
claimed that the fundamental 
problem was that my course 
was not really about ethics at 
all but about “political issues, 
such as the limits on the power 
of constitutional government.” 
As a result, the department 
claimed that my course was 
“not intellectually stimulating, 
because most of it deals with 
political theses from Locke and 
Mill that most Americans take 
for granted anyway. In effect 
he is confirming the students’ 
prejudices.” It also argued 
that the “superficial” level of 
my course was evident in the 
newspaper articles that I would 
hand out on contemporary 
social issues such as abortion, 
doctor-assisted suicide, the 
equal i ty  of  animals ,  and 
freedom of speech.
The department’s tenure 
evaluation of my teaching was 
written by the senior member 
of the department; he based 
this evaluation on his and his 
tenured colleagues’ written 
reports of their classroom visits 
to either my PHIL 100 course or 
to another one of my courses. 
However, this senior member’s own report of my teaching 
was predominant in the department’s evaluation for he stated 
in his report that most of my PHIL 100 course was “not about 
principles of ethics, but about what we would at best call 
politics, such as civil disobedience, liberty, women’s rights, 
animal rights, etc.,” and he objected to what he believed was 
my study of “easy issues discussed regularly in the media 
instead of addressing the fundamental questions, even though 
they are difficult. So the type of material chosen and the level 
of difficulty go hand in hand.”
As a matter of procedure, faculty in the philosophy 
department were not able to review the department’s (or 
chair’s) tenure evaluation, so I did not learn about its assessment 
of my PHIL 100 course until I appealed my negative tenure 
decision. In fact, the only way I obtained the department’s 
tenure evaluation was to get permission from every faculty 
member to release it to me since the process at Xavier did not 
require its release without explicit permission of the members 
of the department.2
Since the main reason for the department’s (and chair’s) 
negative tenure evaluation was its evaluation of my teaching, 
I decided to appeal the decision on the grounds that my 
academic freedom had been violated both in terms of what I 
taught and how I taught it. At Xavier, tenure appeals are only 
done in writing, and they are submitted to the same Tenure 
and Promotion Committee that judges the case in the first 
place. The defense of my appeal seemed very straightforward. 
Departments have a right to frame the subject matter of a course, 
e.g., its central issues, the time period, required readings, etc. 
Within this framework, however, faculty should have the right 
to use their professional judgment to teach material that is 
germane to the subject matter. Xavier presumably adhered 
to this principle of academic freedom since it included in its 
Faculty Handbook the classic 1940 AAUP Statement of Principles 
Table 1. Works taught by semester in my PHIL 100 course. The numbers indicate the order in which 
I taught them.
 F92 S93 F93 S94 F94 S95 F95 S96 F96 S97 F97 S98 F98 S99 
Republic 1 5 5 3 5 6 3 3 5 8 7 6 1 1 
Apology   4 1   1  1  1 1   
Crito    2   2 1 2 2 2 2   
Euthyphro          1     
Camus, The
Plague 
 1 1  1 1  5       
On Liberty 5 3 2 4 3 3 5 4 7 5 5 4   
Utilitarianism 4      4  6 7   4 4 
Subjection of 
Women




        3 3 3 3   
Dworkin on 
pornography

















         6 6 5 5 5 
Kant, 
Groundwork




            3 3 
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on Academic Freedom and Tenure, which states, “teachers 
are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their 
subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their 
teaching controversial matter that has no relation to their 
subject.” In PHIL 100, faculty were required to teach only 
Plato’s Republic; otherwise, they had discretion to assign any 
primary source readings that dealt with the various issues of 
the course, especially justice. There were no other stated or 
unstated guidelines for faculty. The department never defined 
what “real” ethical issues were, never required the teaching 
of certain texts over others, and never required that a faculty 
member examine the most prominent ethical traditions (as was 
implied in the expanded 1996 course description but which was 
not, in practice, followed by the department).
My defense was that I adhered to the framework of the 
course and taught readings and issues that were germane to 
the course description. The department thus did not have a 
right to criticize what I taught since the material and issues 
that I taught had “relation to their subject.” The department 
thus judged my course by reference to arbitrary and unstated 
standards and singled me out for teaching “political” works 
despite the fact that other colleagues who taught the same 
sort of material were not criticized for doing so. In introducing 
the distinction it did between its own conception of how 
the course issues were to be taught and my own (which it 
tendentiously dubbed “political”), the department subverted 
my right—and thus my academic freedom—to teach the 
material in my own way. Although the department claimed 
that I did not teach within the framework of the course, this 
was the very point at issue: they claimed my readings and 
issues were not relevant, and I claimed they were. Academic 
freedom protects the right of a faculty member to disagree 
with colleagues and a department so long as the former can 
make a reasonable case that the readings and themes of a 
course bear a direct relation to it.
As part of my written appeal, I included a letter from a 
member of the philosophy department who explained the 
ideological bias of the department. He pointed out that my 
sympathy for “applied” ethics—evident in the issues that I 
taught in my PHIL 100 course as well as in an article that I wrote, 
solicited by the editor of Xavier’s Alumni magazine, defending 
doctor-assisted suicide—had diminished the philosophical 
respect of my colleagues since applied philosophy was 
considered by them to be “a regrettable devaluation of the 
discipline.” I also included a supportive letter from an ad hoc 
committee of Xavier’s AAUP chapter, which I had asked to 
investigate my tenure decision. The ad hoc committee alleged 
“that there may have been a bias, a bias rooted in sectarian 
philosophical differences, that played an important role in 
the department’s negative evaluation” of my teaching. The 
committee recognized “the seriousness and potentially divisive 
nature” of its own conclusion, and stated that it believed my 
case could have “a chilling effect on academic freedom at 
Xavier.” Finally, there was another supportive letter from a highly 
respected senior member of the faculty who expressed concern 
that the previous two members of the philosophy department 
whom I succeeded and who presented “differing views were 
not granted tenure.” He believed that a third denial would look 
to be more than mere coincidence.
As part of my written appeal, I urged the Tenure and 
Promotion Committee to seek impartial testimony from 
philosophers outside of Xavier to judge whether the material 
that I taught had “relation to the subject” as well as whether 
my methods, in particular my attempts to apply the ideas in 
the readings to current events and to use newspaper articles, 
were pedagogically legitimate. I believed that if I could establish 
my interpretation of the course requirements as legitimate or 
reasonable, then the department’s refusal to grant me tenure 
would constitute a violation of my academic freedom since 
I had taught within the framework of the course. In the end, 
however, the Tenure and Promotion Committee denied my 
request for external review, and it voted against my appeal 
without any comment.
My final recourse on campus was to appeal the violation 
of my academic freedom to a campus Grievance Committee. 
This time, I presented my case in writing and in person, and the 
philosophy department did likewise. The department defended 
its position by citing the Supreme Court case Keyishian v. Board 
of Regents, which affirmed that academic freedom implies the 
right to teach theories that are in conflict with conventional or 
“orthodox” views. The department claimed that since it had 
not required me to present and defend the teaching of Jesuit or 
other Catholic authors or teach and defend Aristotle or Aquinas, 
it did not violate my academic freedom. The department 
argued further that it ultimately had the right to decide what is 
appropriate in its PHIL 100 course:
Clearly, the department must be the judge of what 
is appropriate in a required core course, such as the 
ethics course, and if a teacher persists in teaching 
something else, e.g., political science or civics, he is 
quite properly blamed by the department. Matz taught 
and defended J.S. Mill’s liberalism, as opposed to the 
views of other philosophers. The department never 
raised any objection to his opinions about what was 
true or correct. It stated, however, that if Matz wanted 
to teach Mill’s thought in an ethics course, he should 
discuss Mill’s basic ethical treatise, Utilitarianism, and 
not Mill’s political works. The department was dealing, 
not with Matz’s opinions, orthodox or unorthodox, but 
with the kinds of problems that ought to be addressed 
in an ethics course. Clearly this is a matter which 
the department may and should determine for its 
members.
Of course, the department did have the right to design PHIL 
100 in whatever way it wanted and to have faculty conform 
to these expectations; however, the only explicit expectations 
stated for the course were to teach Plato’s Republic and teach 
primary source material that dealt with the subject matter of 
the course. The department never identified preferred works 
to teach, never distinguished between ethical and “political” 
works, and never explicitly discouraged the teaching of applied 
ethical issues. So, although it is true that the department never 
required me to teach only Jesuit or Catholic writers or to teach 
only Aristotle or Aquinas, it violated my academic freedom in 
forbidding me from teaching applied ethical problems, such as 
the rightful limits of social and political power, the moral and 
legal treatment of women, and the moral status of animals. 
The department’s interpretation of the appropriate issues or 
problems of the course was not the sole legitimate one, and 
since my interpretation was reasonable—indeed, I thought 
it was mainstream—the department violated my academic 
freedom in its negative tenure evaluation. I maintain that the 
department had no authority to settle principled differences 
of opinion regarding pedagogy since academic freedom 
is supposed to protect principled differences of opinion. 
Additionally, the department’s claim that I persisted in defying 
the official guidelines of the course or departmental advice 
was simply mistaken. The only time anyone suggested to me 
that Utilitarianism should be taught instead of On Liberty was 
after the senior member of the department (the one who wrote 
the departmental evaluation) visited my course in spring 1997, 
the semester before I applied for tenure. The department had 
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plenty of opportunity to register a complaint about my course 
before then, but it never did so. I turned in a syllabus to the chair 
every semester beginning in the fall of 1992. Moreover, a year 
or two before I applied for tenure, those who taught PHIL 100 
reevaluated the focus of the course by exchanging syllabi and 
discussing our respective approaches.
The Grievance Committee upheld the department’s 
position. It concluded that regardless of my arguments about 
the philosophical legitimacy of the issues that I taught in my 
PHIL 100 course, the department ultimately had the authority 
to judge. Nonetheless, in the concluding section of its report, 
the Grievance Committee acknowledged the troublesome 
implications for academic freedom in the philosophy 
department. It raised two questions that appeared to support 
my grievance. It asked, “Does the Philosophy department hold a 
‘rigid,’ and perhaps undesirable, adherence to a homogeneous 
approach to teaching?” and “Is there a need for more open and 
collegial intellectual debate regarding teaching and scholarship 
within this department?” It concluded by urging university 
officials “to engage the Philosophy Department in a dialogue 
to explore the possibility of fostering greater academic diversity 
in teaching.”
The Grievance Committee also learned that some 
philosophy faculty felt administrative pressure to hire me 
although I did not fit the “profile” of someone that it would 
normally hire since my philosophical and pedagogical approach 
was contrary to the “prevailing departmental culture,” as 
“applied techniques in the classroom were and remain contrary 
to the department’s ‘norm’ of teaching.” I was never aware 
of these circumstances of my hire until I read the Grievance 
Committee’s report.
The defeat of my grievance exhausted all internal 
processes at Xavier. My final recourse was to bring my case to 
The American Philosophical Association’s Committee for the 
Defense of the Professional Rights of Philosophers. I believed 
that, at long last, I might get the independent, external review of 
my department’s judgments that had been wanting throughout 
the entire grievance process. The allegation that my department 
had violated my academic freedom in its evaluation of my PHIL 
100 course was one of seven allegations that I brought, but I 
believed it was the strongest. After reviewing these allegations, 
the APA Committee decided to investigate three allegations that 
were “especially troubling”; however, to my dismay, the APA 
dropped my allegation about the PHIL 100 course. Since I do 
not know how the department responded to the APA, I can only 
speculate on the reasons the APA did not investigate.
*****
In its “Statement on Procedural Standards in the Renewal or 
Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments,” the AAUP identifies 
a standard to judge whether there has been a violation of 
academic freedom: Did the department give the faculty member 
“adequate consideration”? It defines this standard in procedural 
and not substantive terms:
Was the decision conscientiously arrived at? Was 
all available evidence bearing on the relevant 
performance of the candidate sought out and 
considered? Was there adequate deliberation by the 
department over the import of the evidence in light of 
the relevant standards?...Was the decision a bona fide 
exercise of professional academic judgment? These 
are the kinds of questions suggested by the standard 
of “adequate consideration.3
Without making explicit reference to it, Xavier’s philosophy 
department and Xavier’s Grievance Committee appeared to rely 
on such a standard to judge my case. That is, the issue for them 
was the conscientiousness of the process and not the validity or 
wisdom of the conclusion. While I do not know the grounds of 
the APA’s assessment of my allegation about PHIL 100, I contend 
that a purely procedural standard is inadequate. For this allows 
that even after extensive deliberation, a department of narrow 
ideologues or a department with a few dominant and influential 
ideologues who can stifle the dissent of others can still violate 
a faculty member’s academic freedom. Whether a department 
has given “adequate consideration” to a faculty member 
thus cannot simply be a matter of rendering “conscientious 
judgment”; the competence or substance of that judgment, and 
not merely its process, should also be a condition to protect the 
academic freedom of faculty against colleagues.
I recommend that the APA add a section on “Academic 
Freedom,” perhaps after the section “Evaluation,” in its 
“Statements on the Profession: The Teaching of Philosophy.” 
The addition should call attention to the importance of academic 
freedom, identify what the APA takes to be the principles and 
standard of academic freedom, and describe the relationship 
between a department’s exercise of professional judgment 
and a faculty member’s right of academic freedom. Such a 
statement might be useful in motivating departments to be 
more specific in their course descriptions and expectations for 
faculty and in helping to minimize disputes within a department. 
I believe that unlike the AAUP’s purely procedural standard, 
the APA should support some substantive elements in its 
standard of academic freedom and judge on them. Among 
some of the questions relevant for this expanded standard of 
academic freedom could be: Are the readings and issues in fact 
relevant for the course given the course description? Are certain 
teaching methods in fact legitimate and reasonable? Were the 
APA to fashion an explicit statement in “Statements on the 
Profession: The Teaching of Philosophy,” it would strengthen its 
stance that departments should strive to develop “educational 
experiences of high quality.” After all, institutional judgments 
about the quality of teaching and educational experiences may 
sometimes be nothing but reflections of ideology.4
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the morality of civil disobedience, and moral and legal 
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